

Notes

1. CLARIFICATION OF THE CONTROVERSY

1. Our analysis of freedom owes much to Mortimer J. Adler, *The Idea of Freedom* (2 vols.; Garden City, N.Y.: 1958, 1961), but in many respects we do not follow him.

2. Karl Popper, "Indeterminism Is Not Enough," *Encounter*, 40 (April, 1973), pp. 20-26, discusses a notion of freedom close to this one.

3. Peter van Inwagen, "A Formal Approach to the Problem of Free Will and Determinism," *Theoria*, 40 (1974), pp. 17-20, provides a definition of "free choice" which if specified suitably would be identical with ours.

4. Richard Taylor, *Action and Purpose* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1966), pp. 53-55, argues that freedom of choice is not mere causal contingency between possible happenings, but conceptually involves reference to a person acting.

5. C. D. Broad, "Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism," in *Ethics and the History of Philosophy* (London: 1952), pp. 195-217; Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-112; Roderick Chisholm, "Freedom and Action," in *Freedom and Determinism*, ed. Keith Lehrer (New York: 1966), pp. 17-24; Frederick Ferré, "Self-Determinism," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 10 (1973), p. 169.

6. J. L. Austin, "Ifs and Cans," in *Philosophical Papers*, ed. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock (Oxford: 1961), pp. 205-232, calls attention to the distinction between hypothetical and nonhypothetical uses of "can"; Bruce Aune, "Can," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 2, p. 19, gives a clear account of the sense of "can" involved in "free choice."

7. Chisholm, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

8. Russell's remark is cited by John Hospers, "What Means This Freedom?" in *Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science*, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: 1961), p. 140.

9. Our description of the experience of choice owes much to Yves R. Simon, *Freedom of Choice*, ed. Peter Wolff (New York: 1969), pp. 75-127; Richard Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-257; Paul Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary*, trans. Erazim V. Kohak (Evanston, Ill.: 1966). For other recent accounts

of this experience see Frederick Ferré, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-171; R. C. Skinner, "Freedom of Choice," *Mind*, 72 (1963), pp. 463-480.

10. J. R. Lucas, *The Freedom of the Will* (Oxford: 1970), p. 82, discusses a closely related point and cites relevant literature.

11. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 19-20 and 30-32. In discussing deliberation, we are describing *phenomena* which are admitted even by those who assert that all acts are in principle predictable; see, e.g., Alvin I. Goldman, *A Theory of Human Action* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1970), pp. 194-196.

12. We disagree here with the philosophical tradition exemplified by R. L. Franklin, *Freewill and Determinism: A Study of Rival Conceptions of Man* (London, New York: 1968), pp. 71-79.

13. Douglas Browning, "The Feeling of Freedom," *Review of Metaphysics*, 18 (1964), pp. 123-146, excludes many candidates for the title of "feeling of freedom"; he identifies the feeling with the experience of choice itself (pp. 143-146) and correctly notes that the act of choice is not experienced as a datum (p. 146).

14. Robert Young, "A Sound Self-Referential Argument?" *Review of Metaphysics*, 27 (1973), p. 113, notes that in our earlier treatment of these matters ("Determinism, Freedom, and Self-Referential Arguments," *Review of Metaphysics*, 26 [1972], pp. 3-37), we included an "indeterministic account of the experience of choice" in our definition of determinism. The preceding paragraphs make clear that there is no ground for such an objection against the present work. Young perhaps assumed that to describe the experience of choice is to beg the question in favor of the reality of free choices. Not so. To describe the experience of choice is merely to indicate what the controversy is about.

15. See Carl Ginet, "Can the Will Be Caused?" *Philosophical Review*, 71 (1962), pp. 49-55.

2. ARGUMENTS FOR FREE CHOICE

1. Francisco Suarez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, XIX, ii, 8-15.

2. David Hume, *Enquiries concerning the Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (2nd ed.; Oxford: 1951), p. 94.

3. *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, trans. Elizabeth Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge: 1967), vol. 1, pp. 174-177.

4. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 74-75.

5. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 234-235. For a similar argument proposed by a contemporary philosopher, see R. C. Skinner, "Freedom of Choice," *Mind*, 72 (1963), pp. 463-480.

6. *The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza*, trans. R. H. M. Elwes (New York: 1951), vol. 2, p. 75.

7. Joseph Priestley, *The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated, The Theological and Miscellaneous Works* (London: 1818), vol. 3, p. 482.

8. John Stuart Mill, *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy* (Boston: 1865), vol. 2, p. 264.

9. J. M. E. McTaggart, *Some Dogmas of Religion* (London: 1906), p. 148.

10. Moritz Schlick, *Problems of Ethics*, trans. David Rynin (New York: 1939), pp. 154-155 (emphasis his).

11. Keith Lehrer, "Can We Know that We Have Free Will by Introspection?" *Journal of Philosophy*, 57 (1960), pp. 145-146.

12. Mortimer J. Adler, *The Idea of Freedom* (2 vols.; Garden City, N.Y.: 1958, 1961), vol. 2, pp. 318-319, cites Henry Mansel, F. C. S. Schiller, and Hubert Gruender.
13. Brand Blanshard, "The Case for Determinism," in *Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science*, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: 1961), pp. 20-21.
14. R. D. Bradley, "Free Will: Problem or Pseudo-Problem?" *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 36 (1958), pp. 40-41.
15. Lehrer, *op. cit.*, p. 157.
16. Nicolai Hartmann, *Ethics*, trans. Stanton Coit (London, New York: 1932), vol. 3, pp. 146-149.
17. C. A. Campbell, *On Selfhood and Godhood* (London, New York: 1957), p. 216.
18. Hans Kelsen, *What Is Justice?* (Berkeley, Los Angeles: 1957), pp. 335-340.
19. Bertrand Russell, *Human Society in Ethics and Politics* (New York: 1955), p. 80.
20. Ted Honderich, "One Determinism," in *Essays on Freedom of Action*, ed. Ted Honderich (London, Boston: 1973), pp. 205-214, articulates such a frank proposal.
21. Hume, *op. cit.*, p. 95 (emphasis his).
22. A. J. Ayer, *Philosophical Essays* (London, New York: 1954), pp. 274-277. This assumption is false. The position of those arguing for free choice is that the person choosing is a cause whose choice forms his own character; see C. A. Campbell, *In Defence of Free Will* (London: 1967), pp. 48-53. See also Philippa Foot, "Free Will as Involving Determinism," in *Free Will and Determinism*, ed. Bernard Berofsky (New York, London: 1966), pp. 95-108. We treat this matter at length in chapter three, sections D and E.
23. Ayer, *op. cit.*, p. 282. See also Winston Nesbitt and Stewart Candlish, "On Not Being Able to Do Otherwise," *Mind*, 82 (1973), pp. 321-330.
24. Schlick, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-150, quotation from p. 150 (emphasis his).
25. See: *Nicomachean Ethics* iii, 1111a22-b9 and 1114a32-b25.
26. Schlick, *op. cit.*, p. 152.
27. Russell, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80; other examples are given by Adler, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 307-309 and 430-437; see also Philippa Foot, *loc. cit.* Russell is mistaken in thinking that motivation is irrational if man is free; most who hold for free choice think it limited by many conditions which restrict the live options among which one can choose.
28. Campbell, *In Defence of Free Will*, pp. 23-25.
29. See Honderich, *loc. cit.*
30. W. D. Ross, *Foundations of Ethics* (Oxford: 1939), pp. 250-251.
31. C. D. Broad, "Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism," in *Ethics and the History of Philosophy* (London: 1952), pp. 205-206.
32. William James, *Principles of Psychology* (New York: 1890), vol. 2, p. 573.
33. William James, *Pragmatism and Four Essays from the Meaning of Truth* (Cleveland, New York: 1955), pp. 82-85. *Pragmatism* was originally published in 1907.
34. William James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy* (London, New York, Toronto: 1937), p. 146. "The Dilemma of Determinism" was originally an address, and it was first published in 1884.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 160-170.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 171.
37. William James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (New York: 1912), p. 185.
38. St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* ii, 20.

39. St. Thomas Aquinas, II *Sententiarum*, d. 25, a. 2; *Summa contra gentiles*, II, 47; *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 82, a. 2; I-2, q. 10, a. 2; *De malo*, q. 3, a. 3; q. 6; *In I Perihermenias*, 14, nn. 23-24; *De veritate*, q. 22, a. 6.

40. Elsewhere (*De malo*, q. 6), Aquinas more carefully points out that the will, being not only animate but also immaterial, cannot be moved by any material efficient cause.

41. An attempt at this type of argument or a favorable discussion of it will be found in the following works: Wilbur Marshall Urban, *The Foundations of Ethics* (New York: 1930), pp. 418-419; H. W. B. Joseph, *Some Problems in Ethics* (Oxford: 1931), pp. 14-15; James McTaggart, *Philosophical Studies* (London: 1934), p. 193; A. E. Taylor, "Freedom and Personality," *Philosophy*, 14 (1939), pp. 259-280; A. E. Taylor, "Freedom and Personality Again," *Philosophy*, 17 (1942), pp. 26-37; Paul Weiss, *Nature and Man* (Carbondale, Ill.: 1947), pp. 23-26; C. S. Lewis, *Miracles* (New York: 1947), pp. 23-31; Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology* (Chicago: 1951), vol. 1, pp. 200-201; E. L. Mascall, *Christian Theology and Natural Science* (London: 1956), pp. 212-219; A. C. MacIntyre, "Determinism," *Mind*, 66 (1957), pp. 28-41; Morris Ginsberg, *On the Diversity of Morals* (London: 1962), p. 82; Lionel Kenner, "Causality, Determinism and Freedom of the Will," *Philosophy*, 39 (1964), pp. 233-248; Warner Wick, "Truth's Debt to Freedom," *Mind*, 73 (1964), pp. 527-537; J. D. Mabbott, *Introduction to Ethics* (London: 1966), pp. 115-116; Sir Malcolm Knox, *Action* (London, New York: 1968), pp. 68-80; Norman Malcolm, "The Conceivability of Mechanism," *Philosophical Review*, 77 (1968), pp. 45-72; James N. Jordan, "Determinism's Dilemma," *Review of Metaphysics*, 23 (1969), pp. 48-66; J. R. Lucas, *The Freedom of the Will* (Oxford: 1970), pp. 114-172; William H. Davis, *The Freewill Question* (The Hague: 1971), pp. 74-79; Noam Chomsky, "The Case against B. F. Skinner," *New York Review of Books*, December 30, 1971, pp. 20-26; A. Aaron Snyder, "The Paradox of Determinism," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 9 (1972), pp. 353-356; William Hasker, "The Transcendental Refutation of Determinism," *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 11 (1973), pp. 175-183.

42. See John Laird, *On Human Freedom* (London: 1947), p. 127; G. E. M. Anscombe, "A Reply to Mr. C. S. Lewis' Argument that 'Naturalism' is Self-Refuting," *Socratic Digest*, 4 (1948), pp. 7-16; Margaret Knight, "Consciousness and the Brain," in *Science News*, vol. 25, ed. A. W. Haslett (Harmondsworth: 1952), pp. 98-103; Adolf Grünbaum, "Causality and the Science of Human Behavior," in *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*, ed. Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (New York: 1953), pp. 775-776; A. J. Ayer, *The Concept of a Person* (London: 1963), pp. 266-267; Antony Flew, "A Rational Animal," in *Brain and Mind*, ed. J. R. Smythies (London: 1965), pp. 111-128 and 135; Lucas, *op. cit.*, p. 116; David Wiggins, "Freedom, Knowledge, Belief and Causality," in *Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures*, vol. 3, *Knowledge and Necessity* (London: 1970), pp. 132-154; Adolf Grünbaum, "Free Will and the Laws of Human Behavior," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 8 (1971), pp. 309-310; Ted Honderich and J. A. Faris, "A Conspectus of Determinism," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supp. vol. 44 (1970), pp. 210-214 and 230-234.

43. Jordan, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-54.

44. A. E. Taylor, "Freedom and Personality Again," p. 28.

45. Weiss, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

46. Kenner, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

47. Knox, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

48. Lucas, *op. cit.*, p. 115; it should be noted that Lucas mentions but does not himself accept this view.

49. Snyder, *op. cit.*, p. 354.
50. Grünbaum, "Free Will and the Laws of Human Behavior," pp. 309-310 (emphasis his); see also Wiggins, *op. cit.*, p. 143.
51. Ayer, *The Concept of a Person*, pp. 266-267; see also Laird, *op. cit.*, p. 127.
52. Jordan, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61.
53. Taylor, "Freedom and Personality Again," p. 29.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
55. Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 62; cf. Wick, *op. cit.*, pp. 534 and 537; Kenner, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-248.
56. Kenner, *op. cit.*, p. 247.
57. Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.
58. Lucas, *op. cit.*, pp. 144 and 166.
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 165-166.
60. *Ibid.*, pp. 130-133 and 144-145.

3. ARGUMENTS AGAINST FREE CHOICE

1. John Stuart Mill, *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, selection reprinted in *Free Will*, ed. Sidney Morgenbesser and James Walsh (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1962), p. 60.
2. Brand Blanshard, "The Case for Determinism," in *Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science*, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: 1961), p. 21.
3. Steven M. Cahn, *Fate, Logic, and Time* (New Haven, London: 1967), defines (pp. 1-14) fatalism; he also provides an introduction to relevant literature. See especially Richard Taylor, "Fatalism," *Philosophical Review*, 71 (1962), pp. 56-66; *Metaphysics* (2nd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1974), pp. 58-71. Our analysis of fatalism owes much to Vaughn R. McKim, "Fatalism and the Future: Aristotle's Way Out," *Review of Metaphysics*, 25 (1971), pp. 80-111.
4. Taylor, *Metaphysics*, p. 70. It is worth noting that while Taylor here distinguishes his position from that which depends upon the modal argument, he states (p. 68) his position in terms of the law of excluded middle, and argues in his article, "Fatalism," pp. 63-65, that one must give up the law of excluded middle to avoid fatalism. We recognize, of course, the distinction between the "can" of ability and other sorts of "can," but Taylor's emphasis on the ability-sense of "can" is not formally relevant to the force of the argument, for talk of human ability merely specifies the state of affairs (R) in our formulation of the argument. Raziel Abelson, "Taylor's Fatal Fallacy," *Philosophical Review*, 72 (1963), pp. 93-96, makes this point, but Taylor in his response—"A Note on Fatalism," *Philosophical Review*, 72 (1963), pp. 497-499—seems not to see its force.
5. Cahn, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-117, discusses the point and cites relevant literature; his interpretation of Aristotle seems to us poor compared with that proposed by McKim, *loc. cit.*
6. J. R. Lucas, *The Freedom of the Will* (Oxford: 1970), pp. 69-70, makes this point about two meanings of "true"; see also the works he cites.
7. Pierre Laplace, *Essai philosophique sur les probabilités* (Paris: 1814), p. 2 (trans. by Bernard Carroll, S.J.). For recent definitions of "determinism" in the relevant sense, see Richard Rudner, *Philosophy of Social Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1966), p.

91; Peter van Inwagen, "A Formal Approach to the Problem of Free Will and Determinism," *Theoria*, 40 (1974), p. 11.

8. Lucas, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

9. Henry Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics* (7th ed.; New York: 1966), pp. 62-63. See also Lucas, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-106, for an exposition and critique of physical determinism; Richard Taylor, "Determinism," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 2, pp. 363-365, for a brief exposition. Hobbes, *On Human Nature*, vol. 4, *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, ed. Sir William Molesworth (London: 1840), gives a classic exposition of this view; see especially chapter 12, pp. 67-70. J. J. C. Smart, *Philosophy and Scientific Realism* (New York, London: 1963), provides a typical, recent example; see esp. pp. 8, 15, 47, and 68.

10. Paul Rée, "Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility," in *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy*, ed. P. Edwards and A. Pap (3rd ed.; New York: 1973), pp. 14-15.

11. Jonathan Glover, *Responsibility* (New York: 1970), pp. 21-23, defines determinism as an empirical hypothesis about human behavior.

12. R. B. Brandt and J. Kim, "Wants as Explanations of Actions," *Journal of Philosophy*, 60 (1963), p. 435.

13. See Max Black, "Making Something Happen," in Hook, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45; "I have been arguing that 'cause' is an essentially schematic word, tied to certain more or less stable criteria of application, but permitting wide variation of specific determination according to context and the purposes of investigation. Now, if this is so, any attempt to state a 'universal law of causation' must prove futile. To anybody who insists that 'nothing happens without a sufficient cause' we are entitled to retort with the question, 'What do you mean by 'cause'?' It is safe to predict that the only answer forthcoming will contain such schematic words as 'event,' 'law,' and 'prediction.' These, too, are words capable of indefinite further determination according to circumstances—and they are none the worse for that. But universal statements containing schematic words have no place in rational argument. The fatal defect of determinism is its protean capacity to elude refutation—by the same token, its informative content is negligible. Whatever virtues it may have in encouraging scientists to search for comprehensive laws and theories, there can be no rational dispute about its truth value. Many of the traditional problems of causation disappear when we become sufficiently clear about what we mean by 'cause' and remind ourselves once more of what a peculiar, unsystematic, and erratic notion it is."

14. Bernard Berofsky, *Determinism* (Princeton: 1971), has dealt with many objections which attempt to show determinism meaningless; see esp. part 3, pp. 273-324. See also Glover, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-28.

15. See A. C. MacIntyre, "Determinism," *Mind*, 66 (1957), pp. 39-40: ". . . if determinism rests its hopes on this complex pattern of explanation I find it difficult to see how determinism could ever be verified or falsified. For suppose that the determinist is able to supply a complete explanation of my behaviour in causal terms. Suppose also that my behaviour is rational, that whatever strong reasons are adduced for acting in a certain way I act in that way, that I am infinitely flexible and resourceful in meeting new contingencies. Then no test will be available to decide whether I act as I do because it is the rational way to act or because it is the way in which my deeds are causally determined. For on either supposition I will do the same things. To try and include my reasonableness in a story about causal factors is to try and produce a story about my behaviour sufficiently comprehensive to include everything."

16. Glover, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

17. See, e.g., Arthur Holly Compton, *The Freedom of Man* (New Haven: 1935), pp. 38 ff.; Clark Glymour, "Determinism, Ignorance, and Quantum Mechanics," *Journal of Philosophy*, 68 (1971), pp. 744-751; J. M. Jauch, *Are Quanta Real?* (Bloomington, Ill.: 1973); Alfred Lande, "The Case for Indeterminism," in Hook, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 83-89; Henry Margenau, "The Philosophical Legacy of Contemporary Quantum Theory," in *Mind and Cosmos*, ed. Robert G. Colodny (Pittsburgh: 1966), p. 354. A typical example of the opposing view is Dennis W. Sciama, "Determinism and the Cosmos," in Hook, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 90-91. Sciama bases his case against indeterminism on the possibility of hidden variables in subatomic physical systems apparently indeterministic in nature. But see Jauch, pp. 101-102, on the thus far negative results of scientific efforts to find evidence to support the hidden-variable thesis. To some extent, the dispute appears to be wholly philosophical; see, e.g., S. Körner, "On Philosophical Arguments in Physics," in *Observation and Interpretation*, ed. S. Körner (London: 1957), pp. 97-101; and Philipp Frank, "Einstein, Mach and Logical Positivism," in *Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist*, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (Evanston, Ill.: 1949), pp. 271-286.

18. Felix Mainx, *Foundations of Biology* (Chicago: 1955), p. 74. J.J.C. Smart, *op. cit.*, p. 123, makes the same point.

19. See Sir John Eccles, "Science and Freedom," *Humanist*, 32 (1972), pp. 15-18, on the relatively rudimentary state of scientific theory about brain processes.

20. Karl Popper, *Of Clouds and Clocks* (St. Louis: 1966), pp. 13-14, advances the same objection against Compton's attempt to explain the relationship between quantum indeterminacy and human decisions.

21. Cf. Ernst Cassirer, *Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics* (New Haven, London: 1956), pp. 207-213.

22. Erwin Schrödinger, *Science and Humanism* (Cambridge: 1951), pp. 60-61 (emphasis his). See also F. S. C. Northrup, *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities* (New York: 1959), ch. 11, for an analysis of statistical laws in quantum mechanics.

23. Frederick Ferré, "Self-Determinism," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 10 (1973), p. 165, makes a complementary point. He argues that quantum indeterminacy leaves no room for "ambiguities" of outcome at any level.

24. Carl G. Hempel, "Scientific Explanation," in *Philosophy of Science Today*, ed. Sidney Morgenbesser (New York: 1967), pp. 79-88. We do not endorse the deductive-nomological model but only point out the role it—and similar philosophical interpretations of science—can play in making plausible a deterministic worldview.

25. Jacques Monod, *Chance and Necessity* (New York: 1971), p. 21. Another restriction is suggested by Egon Brunswik, *The Conceptual Framework of Psychology* (Chicago: 1952), pp. 10-11.

26. Werner Heisenberg, *The Physicist's Conception of Nature* (London: 1958), pp. 180-181 (emphasis his).

27. Michael Scriven, "Explanations, Predictions, and Laws," in *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*, ed. Baruch Brody (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1970), p. 100.

28. See Thomas Hobbes, *The Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance*, in Molesworth, ed., *op. cit.*, vol. 5, pp. 105 and 303.

29. Smart, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 47 (emphasis his).

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 120-126.

33. We assume that this extrascientific inquiry is philosophy. Philosophy need not be regarded as a mixed bag, partly mysticism, partly logic, and partly legitimate inquiry, with all the latter part destined to be parceled out in due time to another type of inquiry—science.

34. Sidgwick, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

35. P. H. Nowell-Smith, "Free Will and Moral Responsibility," *Mind*, 57 (1948), p. 47.

36. John Hospers, *Human Conduct: Problems of Ethics* (shorter ed.; New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Atlanta: 1972), pp. 397-453; he refers the reader to other works of his developing the bearing of psychoanalysis upon responsibility.

37. Ernest Jones, *Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis* (New York: 1964), vol. 2, pp. 184-186.

38. Sigmund Freud, *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, in *Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*, ed. A. A. Brill (New York: 1938), pp. 161-162.

39. Sigmund Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, ed. James Strachey and Anna Freud (London: 1963), p. 28.

40. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 13, a. 6, obj. 3. While the statement of the objection here is clear, the response in *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 82, a. 2, ad 1, seems more precise.

41. W. D. Ross, *Foundations of Ethics* (Oxford: 1939), p. 230.

42. Joseph Priestley, *The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated* (London: 1782), pp. 56-57, provides a classic statement of the argument. Rem Blanchard Edwards, *Freedom, Responsibility and Obligation* (The Hague: 1969), provides (p. 2, note 2), additional bibliography and criticizes (pp. 2-17) this argument.

43. George E. Hughes, "Motive and Duty," *Mind*, 53 (1944), p. 317, makes this point clearly. See also Edwards, *op. cit.*, p. 12. Many authors who approach the point express their insight in a confusing way, suggesting that the act of choice somehow adds to the strength or attractiveness of one purpose.

44. Morton White, "Positive Freedom, Negative Freedom and Possibility," *Journal of Philosophy*, 70 (1973), pp. 315-316.

45. For discussion and bibliography, see K. W. Rankin, *Choice and Chance* (Oxford: 1961), pp. 4-12; Mortimer J. Adler, *The Idea of Freedom* (2 vols.; Garden City, N.Y.: 1958, 1961), vol. 2, pp. 294-302 and 488-525; J. R. Lucas, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-59; Lawrence D. Roberts, "Indeterminism, Chance, and Responsibility," *Ratio*, 13 (1971), pp. 195-199; James N. Jordan, "On Comprehending Free Will," *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 11 (1973), pp. 193-195.

46. Philippa Foot, "Free Will as Involving Determinism," in *Free Will and Determinism*, ed. Bernard Berofsky (New York, London: 1966), pp. 95-108.

47. A. C. MacIntyre, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

48. A. J. Ayer, *The Concept of a Person and Other Essays* (London, New York: 1963), p. 255.

49. A. J. Ayer, *Philosophical Essays* (London, New York: 1954), p. 275.

50. Foot, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-107.

51. Lucas, *op. cit.*, p. 58 (emphasis his); see also Roberts, *loc. cit.*, who points out ambiguities in "chance" and shows their relevance to this argument.

52. See C. A. Campbell, *On Selfhood and Godhood* (London, New York: 1957), p. 255.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 176.

54. J. J. C. Smart, *Between Science and Philosophy* (New York: 1968), p. 300.

55. Campbell, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-178.

56. R. E. Hobart, "Free Will as Involving Determinism and Inconceivable without It," in Berofsky, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 67-68.

57. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: 1888), p. 411.

58. Hobart, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71 (emphasis his).

59. Foot, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

60. F. H. Bradley, *Ethical Studies* (2nd ed.; Oxford: 1927), p. 11 (emphasis his).

61. Hobart, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

62. R. L. Franklin, *Freewill and Determinism: A Study of Rival Conceptions of Man* (London, New York: 1968), pp. 216-220 and 285-301, esp. pp. 298-299, clearly sees the role of the principle of sufficient reason in the arguments of the *PNfc*.

63. This formulation of the principle is taken from the *Monadology*, sec. 32, trans. Robert Latta (London: 1898), p. 235. A critique and selection of relevant passages may be found in Bertrand Russell, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* (Cambridge: 1900), pp. 25-39 and 209-212.

64. Taylor, *Metaphysics*, p. 104.

65. Laplace, *loc. cit.*

66. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

67. Hobart, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

69. Roderick Chisholm, "Freedom and Action," in *Freedom and Determinism*, ed. Keith Lehrer (New York: 1966), p. 23.

70. Russell, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-63 and 219-222, quotes the relevant texts and shows the implications of the principle both for Leibniz's own thought and beyond the limits which Leibniz wished to set. We do not treat Leibniz's own views on freedom here, for we regard him as a compatibilist; see Adler, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 539-545, for an exposition of Leibniz's views.

71. J. J. C. Smart, "The Existence of God," in *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, ed. Alasdair MacIntyre and Antony Flew (London: 1955), p. 46.

72. W. V. O. Quine, *From a Logical Point of View* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1953), p. 44.

73. John Dewey, *On Experience, Nature, and Freedom*, ed. Richard Bernstein (Indianapolis, New York: 1960), p. 284.

74. John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: 1957), p. 309.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 305.

76. Dewey, *On Experience, Nature, and Freedom*, *loc. cit.*

77. Edward B. Tylor, "The Science of Culture," in *Readings in Anthropology*, ed. Morton H. Freid (New York: 1959), vol. 2, p. 4.

78. B. F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York: 1971), pp. 3-25.

79. B. F. Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior* (New York: 1953), p. 116.

80. William James, "The Dilemma of Determinism," in *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy* (New York: 1897), pp. 146-183.

81. See Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior*, pp. 426-436.

82. Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (London: 1963), p. 339.

83. *Ibid.*, pp. 342-343 (emphasis his).

84. Thomas Hobbes, in Molesworth, ed., *op. cit.*, vol. 5, pp. 428-429.

85. E.g., Lucas, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-76, seems to accept some limitation of God by himself in order to dissolve the traditional problem.

86. See Adler, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 467-473 for examples of theological compatibilism and a useful bibliography. See also *ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 448-449, where Auer provides a reference to Molina and a brief discussion of *scientia media*. Molina's solution has two implications: that each individual's free acts are free only in the sense that they proceed from his individuality, and that even prior to God's practical knowledge an individual would do these acts. The first implication seems incompatible with *Sfc*; Molina seems to be a compatibilist like Leibniz. The second implication seems incompatible with the Christian teaching on grace which was clarified against Pelagius.

87. Cf. Campbell, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-172.

88. Henry L. Mansel, *Prolegomena Logica* (Oxford: 1851), pp. 304-305.

89. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 10, a. 4. The translation we provide is free; the text reads as follows: "Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Dionysius dicit, 'ad providentiam divinam non pertinet naturam rerum corrumpere, sed servare' (*De divinis nominibus*, c. iv). Unde omnia movet secundum eorum conditionem: ita quod ex causis necessariis per motionem divinam consequuntur effectus ex necessitate; ex causis autem contingentibus sequuntur effectus contingentem. Quia igitur voluntas est activum principium non determinatum ad unum, sed indifferenter se habens ad multa, sic Deus ipsam movet, quod non ex necessitate ad unum determinat, sed remanet motus eius contingens et non necessarius, nisi in his ad quae naturaliter movetur."

90. For a more extended discussion, see Germain Grisez, *Beyond the New Theism: A Philosophy of Religion* (Notre Dame, London: 1975), pp. 241-272. This work grew out of an early draft of the present, brief section. The topic proved too large for adequate treatment as part of a work primarily devoted to freedom.

4. COMPATIBILISM

1. Michel du Bay, *De libero hominis arbitrio eiusque potestate* (Louvain: 1563), chapter 7, writing twenty-five years before the birth of Hobbes, gives a precise formulation of compatibilism: "What comes about voluntarily comes about freely even if it comes about necessarily."

2. Richard Taylor, "Determinism," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 2, p. 366.

3. Thus the reconciliationist attempt need not be based exclusively upon the compatibility with *Nfc* of physical freedom and freedom to do as one pleases. One also can focus upon creative or ideal freedom. Spinoza emphasizes ideal freedom; for an example of reconciliationism emphasizing creative freedom, see John Dewey, "Philosophies of Freedom," in *On Experience, Nature, and Freedom*, ed. Richard Bernstein (Indianapolis, New York: 1960), pp. 283-284.

4. This point does not modify our negative evaluation of this sort of argument; our present point concerns the meaning of "free choice," not the truth of *Sfc*.

5. J. R. Lucas, *The Freedom of the Will* (Oxford: 1970), pp. 22-26, makes several of the same points we make here and cites relevant literature. He expresses (p. 15) the same skepticism we do about the expectation that a philosophical dispute can be settled by stipulating a meaning for a key word.

6. Myles Brand, "Introduction: Ability, Possibility, and Power," in *The Nature of Human Action*, ed. Myles Brand (Glenview, Ill.: 1970), pp. 129-130, makes such a point in respect to Austin's arguments that not all *cans* are constitutionally *iffy*.

7. Lucas, *op. cit.*, p. 21, makes the same point and calls soft determinism a "salvage

operation, to enable the cornered determinist to continue using the everyday concepts of praise, blame, reward, and punishment, or something very like them, in spite of his disbelief in freedom."

8. G. N. A. Vesey, "Agent and Spectator: The Double-Aspect Theory," in *Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures*, vol. 1, *The Human Agent* (London, New York: 1968), pp. 139-159, relates the position with which we are concerned here to a wider context; we adopt his felicitous name for the position but use it in a specific sense.

9. A. I. Melden, *Free Action* (London, New York: 1961), p. 184; cf. pp. 201-202, where Melden characterizes the supposed error he is dealing with as a "category mistake." He thinks that "the trouble is that the applicability in principle of the causal model is taken for granted." But Melden does not show that the determinist is making a category mistake rather than a false statement. It seems clear to us that many determinists either assert that the causal model is applicable in principle to human acts or assert a proposition which entails this, and that they regard such assertions precisely as what they hold. If such assertions are false, determinists are in error, not confused.

10. The literature is vast. A few treatments which are either seminal or recent and important are: C. I. Lewis, *Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge* (New York: 1956), pp. 139-143; *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* (LaSalle, Ill.: 1946), pp. 3, 6, 16-17, and esp. 203-206 and 480-481; Arthur Edward Murphy, *The Theory of Practical Reason*, ed. A. I. Melden (LaSalle, Ill.: 1964), pp. 181-182; F. Waismann, "Language Strata," in *Logic and Language, Second Series*, ed. Antony Flew (New York: 1953), pp. 28-31; D. M. MacKay, "On the Logical Indeterminacy of a Free Choice," *Mind*, 69 (1960), pp. 31-40; Anthony Kenny, "Freedom, Spontaneity and Indifference," in *Essays on Freedom of Action*, ed. Ted Honderich (London, Boston: 1973), pp. 89-104.

11. Stuart Hampshire, *Freedom of the Individual* (London: 1965), p. 111, rejects the replacement of the language of action with a "neutral language of natural law," but leaves open the possibility that "some other thesis of determinism" might be applicable to human actions.

12. Wilfrid Sellars, *Science, Perception and Reality* (London, New York: 1963), seems to espouse a version of this possibility when he says (p. 40) that the conceptual framework of persons completes the scientific image "not with more ways of saying what is the case, but with the language of community and individual intentions. . ." (emphasis his).

13. Richard Rorty, "Mind-Body Identity, Privacy and Categories," *Review of Metaphysics*, 19 (1965), pp. 24-54, makes a plausible case for the elimination of ordinary language about sensations. We think a similarly plausible case could be made for the elimination of the language of action, provided that one is willing to accept all the implications of determinism.

14. Lucas, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18, makes the same point.

15. All quotations from this work in the text are from: Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London, New York: 1929).

16. Lewis White Beck, *A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason* (Chicago: 1960), p. 192. John R. Silber, "The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion," in Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, trans. T. M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: 1960), pp. xciv-ciii, provides an analysis which confirms ours of the problems raised by Kant's solution to the third antinomy.

17. Lucas, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

18. Lucas, *ibid.*, provides a similar example.

19. Hegel is perhaps the most important philosopher who holds a point-of-view theory of reconciling what would otherwise be contradictions. He thinks he can surmount all antinomies by moving to a higher viewpoint in the dialectic; his inconsistency appears in his inability in principle to reconcile the viewpoint of the Absolute with those of its moments, since there is no higher viewpoint from which one can regard both the Absolute and its moments.

20. We realize that many philosophers would reject what we say here about propositional knowledge, inasmuch as we deny conceptual relativism. This topic, if pursued, would open too wide an area of debate for adequate treatment in the present work. We think that a valid defense of the nonrelativity of propositional knowledge is presented by Roger Trigg, *Reason and Commitment* (Cambridge: 1973).

5. PRELIMINARIES TO THE ARGUMENT

1. Our notion of propositional acts is somewhat like J. L. Austin's notion of illocutionary acts and R. M. Hare's notion of the neustic component of a sentence. However, we are not prepared to commit ourselves to the view that propositional acts are exclusively linguistic.

2. See Plato, *Theatetus* 182D-183B; Aristotle, *Metaphysics* iv, 1005b6-1012b31.

3. C. K. Grant, "Pragmatic Implication," *Philosophy*, 33 (1958), p. 309.

4. Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead, *Principia Mathematica* (2nd ed.; Cambridge: 1927), vol. 1, pp. 37-38 and 60-65.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

6. J. R. Lucas, *The Freedom of the Will* (Oxford: 1970), pp. 116-120, cites this point as one of the reasons why philosophers remain skeptical about the effectiveness of the argument that determinism is self-refuting.

7. See Frederic Fitch, "Self-Reference and Philosophy," *Mind*, 55 (1946), pp. 64-73; Jørgen Jørgensen, "Some Reflexions on Reflexivity," *Mind*, 62 (1953), pp. 289-290; and R. L. Martin, "Towards a Solution of the Liar Paradox," *Philosophical Review*, 76 (1967), pp. 279-311.

8. See Robert J. Richman, "On the Self-Reference of a Meaning Theory," *Philosophical Studies*, 4 (1953), pp. 69-72.

9. See W. V. O. Quine, *The Ways of Paradox* (New York: 1966), pp. 4 and 13-14.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-12.

11. See Jørgensen, *op. cit.*, pp. 290-291; Alf Ross, "On Self-Reference and a Puzzle in Constitutional Law," *Mind*, 78 (1969), pp. 7-12; Gilbert Ryle, "Heterologicality," *Analysis*, 11 (1950-1951), pp. 67-68.

12. W. D. Hart, "On Self-Reference," *Philosophical Review*, 79 (1970), pp. 523-528, points out that there are logical peculiarities in certain of the statements we call "performatively self-referential." In those performatively self-referential statements where the reference is to the sentence as a sentence in a particular language, translation can become problematical. But this difficulty is not as troublesome as Hart suggests, since translation does not preserve the statement, but only the proposition. Obviously, the proposition in a performatively self-referential statement—as distinct from a performatively self-referential proposition—in which the reference is to the sentence as an instance of a particular language will not be self-referential when translated into some other language.

13. Jaakko Hintikka, *Knowledge and Belief* (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1962), pp. 64-78, provides a discussion of Moore's paradox of saying and disbelieving. Hintikka's notion of doxastic indefensibility is somewhat similar to our notion of self-defeat.
14. James N. Jordan, "Determinism's Dilemma," *Review of Metaphysics*, 23 (1969), pp. 50, 64, and 66.
15. David Wiggins, "Freedom, Knowledge, Belief and Causality," in *Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures*, vol. 3, *Knowledge and Necessity* (London: 1970), p. 134 (emphasis his).
16. See Jaakko Hintikka, "Cogito ergo Sum: Performance or Inference?" *Philosophical Review*, 71 (1962), pp. 3-32.
17. See Richard Rorty, "The Limits of Reductionism," in *Experience, Existence and the Good*, ed. I. Lieb (Carbondale, Ill.: 1961), pp. 104-107.
18. Lionel Kenner, "Causality, Determinism and the Will," *Philosophy*, 39 (1964), p. 234, points out that it may be less easy than one might suppose to utter a deterministic hypothesis simply as a heuristic principle: "Now, it is customary these days to treat 'Every event has a cause' as a heuristic maxim. It is certainly true that the proposition can neither be proved nor disproved, but it would be a joke in very bad taste for an elderly scientist to tell his apprentices that they must always go on looking for a cause unless the elderly scientist believed that there, in fact, always *was* a cause. 'Always look for a cause' is only honest advice if it is believed that there always is a cause. When the determinist formulates his position in terms of causality the proposition 'Every event must have a cause' must be taken as a statement of fact. It is quite another matter that this key proposition in the formulation of the determinist position can neither be proved nor disproved" (emphasis his).
19. John R. Searle, *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge: 1969), pp. 54-71.
20. Wilfrid Sellars, "Language as Thought and as Communication," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 29 (1969), p. 511 (emphasis his).
21. Wilfrid Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes* (London, New York: 1968), p. 175.
22. Roderick M. Chisholm, *Perceiving: A Philosophical Study* (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1957), pp. 3-39 and 96-112; *Theory of Knowledge* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1966), pp. 38-55; "On the Nature of Empirical Evidence," in *Empirical Knowledge: Readings from Contemporary Sources*, ed. Roderick M. Chisholm and Robert J. Schwartz (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1973), pp. 224-249; *The Problem of the Criterion* (Milwaukee: 1973), pp. 33-37.
23. W. V. O. Quine, *The Roots of Reference* (LaSalle, Ill.: 1973), p. 138.
24. Arthur Edward Murphy, *The Theory of Practical Reason*, ed. A. I. Melden (LaSalle, Ill.: 1964), p. 182.
25. Max Black, *Margins of Precision* (Ithaca, London: 1970), pp. 86-89.
26. See Jonathan Glover, *Responsibility* (New York: 1970), p. 23, note 1: The hypothesis that a machine is governed by causal laws ". . . is only verified, strictly speaking, when it is the *simplest* hypothesis to give the greatest power of successful prediction. It is notoriously true that logically incompatible theories can generate identical predictions. Although the notion of simplicity must be invoked here to explain how determinism is verifiable, I shall not attempt the difficult task of analysing the concept" (emphasis his).
27. Richard Taylor, *Metaphysics* (2nd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1974), p. 105.
28. Wilfrid Sellars, *Science, Perception and Reality* (New York, London: 1963), p. 355.
29. Chisholm, "On the Nature of Empirical Evidence," p. 241.

6. FREE CHOICE ESTABLISHED

1. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, in *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics*, trans. T. K. Abbott (4th ed., rev.; London: 1889), pp. 116-117 and 131-133.

2. Michael Slote, *Reason and Scepticism* (London, New York: 1970), pp. 99-100.

3. For a more extensive discussion of rationality norms as the ethics of inquiry and a comparison of them with Kant's notion of regulative principles, see Germain Grisez, *Beyond the New Theism: A Philosophy of Religion* (Notre Dame, London: 1975), pp. 76-81 and 168-172.